Wolf v. Moughon: A Case Study in Negligence Per Se

Imagine getting into a car accident that wasn’t your fault. Now imagine losing your case in court. Sounds unfair, right? That’s exactly what happened to Mary and Shannon Wolf in Houston. But here’s the twist: they should have won their case easily.

So, what went wrong? And more importantly, how can you avoid the same mistake if you ever end up in court? Joel M. Vecchio – a car accident lawyer in Plano – explains what happened.

When we look into this Texas car crash case deeper, we find:

• The one legal strategy that could have changed everything.
• Why the jury made a surprising decision.
• How a simple driving mistake can cost you big time.

Read on to discover how a small detail in the law can make or break your case. You’ll learn why choosing the right lawyer isn’t just important – it’s everything.

Case Background

• In November 1974, Carol Moughon’s vehicle crossed the center line of a Houston city street, hitting the Wolfs’ vehicle.
• This resulted in significant damage to the Wolfs’ vehicle and personal injuries to Mary and Shannon Wolf.
• Carol Moughon had taken her car to a repair shop two days earlier for brake problems.
• Carol Moughon couldn’t explain why her car crossed into the wrong lane.

The subsequent legal proceedings highlight the critical distinction between common law negligence and negligence per se in Texas traffic law.

Legal Context

Negligence Per Se in Texas

Negligence per se is a legal doctrine where the violation of a statute designed to protect public safety automatically constitutes negligence. In Texas, this doctrine has been consistently applied in traffic law cases.

Relevant Statute

In 1974, the Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, Article 6701d, Section 52 stated:

Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway.

This statute was designed to prevent head-on collisions and protect public safety on roadways. This statute was repealed in 1995, and the Texas Transportation Code Section 545.051 now governs the rules for driving on the right side of the roadway.

Sec. 545.051.  DRIVING ON RIGHT SIDE OF ROADWAY.  (a)  An operator on a roadway of sufficient width shall drive on the right half of the roadway…

Case Progression

Initial Trial

The case was initially presented as a common law negligence claim. The jury was asked:

1. “Do you find that the failure of Carol Moughon to keep her vehicle entirely within the right half of the roadway was negligence?”
2. “Did Carol Moughon fail to make such an application of the brakes as a person using ordinary care would have made?”

The jury answered “No” to both questions, resulting in a take-nothing judgment against the Wolfs.

A “take-nothing judgment” is when the person suing (in this case, the Wolfs) doesn’t get anything they asked for in the lawsuit. It’s like going to a store and leaving with empty hands – you “take nothing” with you. For the Wolfs, this meant they didn’t get any money to pay for their car damage or injuries. They basically lost the case.

Analysis of Jury Decision

The jury’s “No” answers to both questions can be attributed to several factors:

1. Framing of Questions: The questions were framed in terms of “negligence” and “ordinary care,” concepts that can be subjective and open to interpretation. This allowed the jury to consider Moughon’s intentions and efforts rather than focusing solely on her actions.
2. Sympathy Factor: Moughon’s testimony about recent brake repairs may have garnered sympathy from the jury. They might have viewed her as a responsible driver who was trying to address vehicle issues, rather than as someone negligent.
3. Lack of Clear Causation: The questions didn’t establish a clear link between Moughon’s actions and the accident. This allowed the jury to speculate about other possible causes.
4. High Bar for Negligence: In common law negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care. The jury may have felt that Moughon’s actions, while resulting in an accident, didn’t rise to the level of failing to exercise reasonable care.
5. Confusion About Legal Standards: Without clear instruction on the relevant traffic law, the jury may have been unsure about what exactly constitutes negligence in this situation.
6. Focus on Brake Application: The second question specifically about brake application might have misled the jury into thinking that proper brake use was the primary issue, rather than the fact of crossing the center line.

This outcome underscores the importance of properly framing the case and jury questions to focus on the most relevant legal issues.

Appeal

On appeal, the court recognized that the case should have been tried under the theory of negligence per se. The court suggested that more appropriate questions would have been:

1. “Did Carol Moughon’s vehicle cross the center line of the road?”
2. “If yes, was there any unavoidable reason for the vehicle to cross the center line?”
3. “Did the position of Carol Moughon’s vehicle on the left side of the road directly lead to the collision with the Wolfs’ vehicle?”

Legal Analysis

Negligence Per Se Application

The appeals court correctly recognized that Moughon’s violation of Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, Article 6701d, Section 52 constituted negligence per se. This shifted the burden to Moughon to provide a legally acceptable excuse for the violation.

Article 6701d was repealed in 1995, and the Texas Transportation Code Section 545.051 now governs the rules for driving on the right side of the roadway. It requires drivers to stay on the right unless they are passing, avoiding an obstacle, or other specific situations that permit driving on the left.

Excuse and Proximate Cause

Moughon claimed her car had brake problems, but failed to provide evidence that these problems caused her to cross the center line. In negligence per se cases, the defendant must provide some evidence of a legally acceptable excuse, such as an emergency, incapacity, or impossibility of compliance.

Proximate Cause

The court found that Moughon’s unexcused violation of the statute also established proximate cause as a matter of law. The statute itself provides guidance on foreseeability, as it’s designed to prevent the exact type of accident that occurred.

How We Could Have Better Defended the Wolfs

1. Proper Legal Theory: We would have presented the case under the theory of negligence per se from the outset, focusing on the statutory violation rather than common law negligence.
2. Crossing the center line can be presented as “failure to drive on the right side of the roadway“, which violates specific statutes in the Texas Transportation Code. This could also be cited as “driving on the wrong side of the road” or “crossing into oncoming traffic.”
3. Effective Jury Questions: We would have proposed jury questions that directly addressed the elements of negligence per se, similar to those suggested by the appeals court.
4. Burden of Proof: We would have emphasized that once the statutory violation was established, the burden shifted to Moughon to provide a legally acceptable excuse.
5. Expert Testimony: We could have brought in an expert to testify about the mechanics of the accident, potentially disproving Moughon’s claim about brake issues.
6. Precedent Citation: We would have cited relevant Texas Supreme Court cases establishing the application of negligence per se in similar traffic law violations.

Conclusion

The Wolf v. Moughon case underscores the importance of properly framing a case under the correct legal theory. By applying the doctrine of negligence per se and focusing on the statutory violation, we could have secured a more favorable outcome for the Wolfs at the initial trial stage, avoiding the need for a costly and time-consuming appeal process.

At The Law Office Of Joel M. Vecchio, P.C., we have a strong understanding of Texas traffic law and the nuances of negligence per se. This positions us to effectively represent clients in similar cases, ensuring that their rights are fully protected under the law.